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The law, for all its failings, has a noble goal-to make the little bit of
life that people can actually control more just. We can't end disease
or natural disasters, but we can devise rules for our dealings with
one another that fairly weigh the rights and needs of everyone, and
which, therefore, reflect our best vision of ourselves.

-Scott
I.

Turow'

INTRODUCTION

The ultimate underlying question for any legal system or rule of
law is "whether it provides a mechanism whereby the participants can
reasonably predict the outcome of litigation prior to the actual deci* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2005, University of Puget
Sound. I would like to thank Professor Kenneth Casebeer for his invaluable guidance in the
development of this note and my family and friends for their encouragement and support. Special
thanks to Mary Jo Stastny, Lee Stastny, Michael Longo, and Freddy Funes.

1. Starbucks: The Way I See It # 271, http://www.starbucks.comlretail/thewayiseeitdefault.
asp?act=l&last=39 (last visited May 17, 2008).
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sion. '' 2 Predictability-that is, the ability of individuals to make some
approximation of the probability of a given outcome-is one of the primary underlying goals of the American judicial system.3 Predictability
reduces the costs of litigation and promotes settlement and judicial efficiency. Predictability increases access to the judicial system by providing some basis upon which litigants can initially asses the merits of their
claims, and allows for an increased faith in the judicial system as a sys-

tem of laws-as a system in which cases are judged upon the merits,
rather than on perceived biases of judges.4 Judicial discretion often
exists of necessity, and certainly some level of judicial discretion is
inherent in statutory interpretation.5 Judicial discretion, while necessary,
particularly in the area of statutory interpretation, greatly reduces predictability, thus raising the costs of litigation, discouraging settlement,
widening the information gap between litigants, and ultimately under2. Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory of Jurisprudence: The "Decisionmaker" as the
Source of Law-The Ohio Supreme Court's Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a
Model, 30 AKRON L. REv. 393, 440 (1997).
3. For good discussions on the benefits of predictability in law, see Richard A. Posner, The
Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757 (1975); and Paul H. Rubin, Predictabilityand
the Economic Approach to Law: A Comment on Rizzo, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1980). The
presumption that predictability is beneficial underlies most law and economics arguments. See
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,
748 (1988) (recognizing the legal values of "consistency, coherence, fairness, equality,
predictability and efficiency").
4. Reflective of the concerns associated with ad hoc, unguided decision making is Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Addressing the issue of
separation of powers, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's adoption of an ad hoc standard,
stating, "Evidently, the governing standard is to be what might be called the unfettered wisdom of
a majority of this Court, revealed to an obedient people on a case-by-case basis. This is not only
not the government of laws that the Constitution established; it is not a government of laws at all."
Id. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DIscRETION 189 (Yadin
Kaufmann trans., 1989) ("A fundamental characteristic of every proper judicial process is that the
judge who decides the controversy acts impartially. It is essential that the parties to the
proceeding and the public as a whole be convinced that the judge does not prefer one party or the
other because of that party's characteristics or because he belongs to one or another group of
people. . . . Absence of bias is essential to the judicial process. Without it, the public's
confidence in the judiciary branch will wane. And without public faith, adjudication cannot carry
out its function.").
5. For a thoughtful discussion of the uncertainty of language, see BARAK, supra note 4, at
46-47.
The statutory norm is expressed in the language of humans, which is composed of
signs or symbols that have no independent internal meaning, but rather constitute
descriptions that are accepted by people who speak the same language. These
descriptions do not always conjure up a single, unitary image in the minds of all
who use the same language, but rather they occasionally produce several images
within the same user and occasionally different images within different users. This
is why the language of the statute is at times ambiguous, vague, obscure, and opentextured.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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mining numerous other underlying goals of the judicial system, including judicial economy, equality, and fairness.
This article analyzes broad questions of the benefits of, necessity
of, and problems created by judicial discretion in the context of statutory
interpretation through a case-study analysis of the current state of the
law of collective-action certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) within the Eleventh Circuit. The narrow focus of this article
will be on conditional-certification decisions by district courts within the
Eleventh Circuit. FLSA collective-action certification decisions are a
fruitful area for analysis, as these decisions occur in the context of wide
trial-court discretion and minimal direction from the statutory enactment, the United States Supreme Court, and the circuit courts. Further,
in the area of collective-action certification, broad discretion and the
absence of direction have resulted in widely disparate treatment and outcomes from case to case. The current state of the law in this area in the
Eleventh Circuit is highly illustrative of the problems commonly associated with unbounded judicial discretion.
In the context of FLSA collective-action litigation, where judicial
discretion is not bound within a workable and predictable framework,
the result is a severe reduction in predictability and an associated
increase in the prevalence of ills associated with such uncertainty.
Where FLSA plaintiffs already face an uncertain level of risk in the form
of employer retaliation for filing claims, the uncertainty that couples collective-action certification has the potential to severely undermine both
the intended goals of the collective-action provision and the FLSA more
generally.
The statutory provision of the FLSA that provides for the creation
of "collective actions," like many statutory provisions, paints with broad
brush strokes, leaving many questions regarding the procedures and
standards for the creation of collective actions unanswered. Over the
years, the courts have struggled to fill in these gaps and to create workable standards and procedures that balance the competing goals of the
collective-action mechanism and the FLSA more generally. Within the
Eleventh Circuit, while the procedures applied to collective-action certification have become relatively standardized, the standards applied to
certification decisions have remained largely amorphous. Standards set
forth by the Eleventh Circuit, such as "lenient," "more lenient," and
"more stringent," have left district courts largely to their own devices.
The resultant lack of consistency between district court rulings has led
not only to the expected result of a reduction in predictability, but in
some cases has established a standard that leaves plaintiff-employees
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that seek to proceed collectively trapped in a puzzle of contradictory
conditions and set up to lose.
Part II of this article begins by examining some general notions and
theories about judicial discretion and uncertainty 6 in the context of litigation. Part III provides an overview and history of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Portal-to-Portal Amendments of 1947, which
created the provisions allowing for "collective actions." Part IV
presents an overview of Eleventh Circuit decisions on questions of the
procedures and standards to be applied to FLSA collective-action certification. Finally, Parts V and VI examine a sample of recent rulings by
district courts within the Eleventh Circuit on motions for collectiveaction certification and provide some conclusions regarding the effects
of discretion in this area of the law. These parts further address the
extent to which the indefiniteness of the standards and procedures in this
area of the law may ultimately serve to undermine the goals of the collective-action mechanism and the FLSA as a remedial statute, potentially leaving plaintiffs without an effective remedy.7

II.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND UNCERTAINTY

Predictability is best served by clear "bright line rules," as opposed
to flexible standards applied through the use of judicial discretion.8 The
question "of the extent to which legal commands should be promulgated
as rules or standards .. .has received substantial attention from legal
commentators." 9 Similarly, numerous legal scholars have addressed
issues of the propriety of judicial discretion and the necessary balance
that must be struck between discretion and rules that allow for predictability.' 0 Professor Carl Schneider's observations are reflective of the
6. By "uncertainty" this article refers to a lack of predictability. Specifically, as applied
within the context of litigation, by "uncertainty" I mean an inability to predict the probability of
any given outcome.
7. "A legal right without a remedy would be an anomaly in the law." Peck v. Jenness, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 612, 623 (1849).
8. An examination of the literature comparing rules and standards and the literature
comparing rules and judicial discretion reveal that any distinction that can be made between
"standards" and "judicial discretion" is not outcome determinative. Judicial discretion can be
understood as the method through which standards are applied.
9. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559
(1992) (citing Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974)). See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969)

(discussing ways to structure and check discretion); Anthony I. Ogus, Quantitative Rules and
JudicialDecision Making, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 210 (Paul Burrows & Cento G.

Veljanovski eds., 1981) (discussing the quantitative character of rules).
10. See, e.g., BARAK; supra note 4; Steven J. Cleveland, Reply to Judge Easterbrook:Judicial
Discretion and Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 31 (2004); Carl E. Schneider,
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general understanding of the necessity of judicial discretion:
In a modem society, the law regulates the complex behavior of millions of people. To do this efficiently, to do this at all, it must use
broadly applicable rules. Yet such rules are bound to be incomplete,
to be ambiguous, to fail in some cases, to be unfair in others. Some
of these failures can be ameliorated by according discretion to the
administrators and judges who apply the rules. Yet doing so dilutes
the advantages of rules and spawns the risks discretion is heir to.
Working out the proper balance between rules and discretion is thus
both necessary and perplexing in every area of law."
Discretion is present in every area of the law and is exercised by all
branches of government to varying degrees. 2 However, "it is the discretion exercised in the judicial branch with which lawyers are traditionally most familiar and concerned." 3 In writing legislation, Congress
often does, and indeed often must, design legislative enactments in such
a way that the language of the act is ambiguous, malleable, or, in the
very least, subject to more than one interpretation. The inevitable ambiguity that accompanies many statutory enactments stems in part from
necessity: first, because it would be impossible for Congress to draft a
statute that contemplates every potential contingency and factual circumstance to which the statutory enactment may apply, 4 and, second,
because it is sometimes the case that legislators can only reach an agreement on a general policy or proposition, while continuing to disagree as
to other relevant matters, such as the means and methods of implementation and enforcement.' 5 The ambiguity inherent in statutes also stems
from a need and desire for an efficient and effective government; were
Congress to attempt to draft statutes in an exhaustive manner, very little
would get done. Congress thus leaves much of the task of interpreting
and applying statutory language to the judiciary, which must exercise
Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L.

2215 (1991).
11. Schneider, supra note 10, at 2217; see also Kaplow, supra note 9, at 557 ("Rules typically
are more costly than standards to create, whereas standards tend to be more costly for individuals
to interpret when deciding how to act and for an adjudicator to apply to past conduct. Second,
when individuals can determine the application of rules to their contemplated acts more cheaply,
conduct is more likely to reflect the content of previously promulgated rules than of standards that
will be given content only after individuals act.") (emphasis omitted).
12. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 2232 (addressing the ubiquity of discretion in the law).
13. Id. at 2233.
14. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 31 ("The legislature cannot craft statutes to govern every
(in)action.").
15. Schneider, supra note 10, at 2233 ("As Professor Chayes observes: 'Congress is often
unwilling or unable to do more than express a kind of general policy objective or orientation ....
[T]he result is to leave a wide measure of discretion to the judicial delegate.'" (quoting Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1314 (1976))
(alterations in original).
REV.
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discretion in interpreting statutes.' 6
Various scholars have suggested numerous definitions of "judicial
discretion," but the definition most often put forth is "the power the law
gives the judge to choose among several alternatives, each of them being
lawful."' 7 Discretion is most often examined in opposition to rules,
which can be defined as "mechanisms which limit discretion and engender a more reliable and predictable legal system."' 8 Judicial discretion
can exist to varying degrees such that "there is rarely such a thing as a
pure rule or pure discretion and . . . most cases are decided through a
tangled web of rules and discretion."' 9 On the grey area between rules
and discretion, Professor Schneider further notes,
On the continuum between rules and discretion lie a number of intermediate categories. Some of these can be derived from the work of
Ronald Dworkin. For instance, he calls "a 'policy' that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in
some economic, political, or social feature of the community. ..."
He calls "a 'principle' a standard that is to be observed, not because it
will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation
deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." He distinguishes policies
and principles from rules: "Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing
fashion.... ." Policies and principles, then, can be thought of as less
16. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 31 ("[W]hen a statute is enacted, the legislature knows that
its chosen language may bear more than one interpretation, entrusting the judiciary with discretion
to identify the correct meaning of that inevitably ambiguous language. For these and other
reasons, judges must exercise discretion when interpreting statutes. Of course, certain exercises of
judicial discretion may be necessary or appropriate, whereas other types of judicial discretion may
be unnecessary or inappropriate.") (footnotes omitted).
17. BARAK, supra note 4, at 7; see also Schneider, supra note 10, at 2227-28. Aharon Barak
further noted,
Judicial discretion, then, means the power the law gives the judge to choose among
several alternatives, each of them being lawful. This definition assumes, of course,
that the judge will not act mechanically, but will weigh, reflect, gain impressions,
test, and study. Yet this conscious use of the power of thought does not define
judicial discretion. It only suggests how the judge must act within the framework of
his discretion. Indeed, judicial discretion, by definition, is neither an emotional nor
a mental state. It is, rather, a legal condition in which the judge has the freedom to
choose among a number of options. Where judicial discretion exists, it is as though
the law were saying, 'I have determined the contents of the legal norm up to this
point. From here on, it is for you, the judge, to determine the contents of the legal
norm, for I, the legal system, am not able to tell you which solution to choose.' It is
as though the path of the law came to a junction, and the judge must decide-with
no clear and precise standard to guide him-which road to take.
BARAK, supra note 4, at 7-8.
18. Moran, supra note 2, at 442; see also Schneider, supra note 10, at 2226 (describing an
ideal rule as an "authoritative, mandatory, binding, specific, and precise direction to a judge that
instructs him how to decide a case or resolve a legal issue").
19. Schneider, supra note 10, at 2226.
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directive and definite rules.2 °

In the context of statutes, Congress will often set forth a general policy
objective at which the statutory provision is aimed. These policy state-

ments certainly provide some framework within which judicial discretion may be bound, thus limiting judicial discretion and the ills
associated therewith.
While discretion may be necessary, too much discretion has the
potential to severely undermine predictability goals, thereby discouraging settlement, judicial economy, and fairness. Where parties do not
have access to accurate information regarding their likelihood of success
in litigation, they will be forced to make due with the information that is
available. This may result in a willingness to settle otherwise meritorious claims for less compensation than might otherwise be obtained and
an unwillingness to settle claims that may lack merit.2 ' If the parties
have no basis upon which to asses the merits of their claims, relative
optimism may result in a general unwillingness to engage in settlement.2 2 Further, where parties to litigation perceive a system of justice
in which cases are decided without rules, faith in the judicial system

may be substantially diminished.
III.

HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
AND PORTAL-TO-PORTAL AMENDMENTS

A.

History and Overview of the FLSA

Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to provide protection to "those

who toil in factory and on farm" to obtain a fair day's pay for a fair
day's work. 23 The FLSA establishes labor standards in minimum
20. Id. at 2226-27 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
21. Of course, "merit" is determined on the basis of rules such that the term itself only
possesses meaning where judicial discretion is not absolute and some rule, policy, or principle is
present.
22. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 406-07 (4th ed. 2004)
("Although there are several strands of the argument, the simplest explanation is that trials occur
because the parties have different expectations about the value of a trial: the plaintiff expects a
large judgment at trial, and the defendant expects a small judgment at trial. In these
circumstances, the parties are relatively optimistic. Given relative optimism, the plaintiff demands
a large settlement and the defendant offers a small settlement, so the parties cannot agree on the
Relative optimism about trial makes settlement out of court
terms for settling out of court ....
difficult.").
23. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to Congress Recommending Legislation
Establishing Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours (May 24, 1937), in NOTHING TO FEAR: THE
SELECTED ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, 1932-1945, at 109 (B.D. Zevin, ed.,
1946). President Roosevelt also stated, "A self-supporting and self-respecting democracy can
plead no justification for the existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers'
wages or stretching workers' hours." Id at 104.
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wage,2 4 overtime pay, 25 and child labor 26 for workers "engaged in" or
27
"in the production of goods for" interstate and foreign commerce.
These remedial measures were designed "to raise the wages of the most
poorly paid workers and to reduce the hours of those most

overworked.

28

The principle requirements of the FLSA are the payment of a minimum wage and the payment of time and a half for hours worked over
forty per week for non-exempt employees. "Congress enacted the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) as a remedial and humanitarian
measure to stabilize the economy and protect the common labor force in
response to the postdepression predominance of poverty and the fear of

an ever-increasing decline in the economy.

' 29

"Low wages, long work-

ing hours, and a high unemployment rate were" widely problematic during this time, and Congress sought a way to counteract these ills by
establishing minimum-wage standards and "encouraging the spread of

employment.

30

Under the FLSA, an action for damages may be brought either individually or collectively by an aggrieved employee under section 16(b),31
24. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
25. Id. § 207.
26. Id. § 212.
27. Id. §§ 206(a), 207(a).
28. H.R. REP. No. 75-1452, at 9 (1937); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 706 (1945) ("The legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an intent on the
part of Congress to protect certain groups of the population from sub-standard wages and
excessive hours which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in
interstate commerce."); id. at 707 n.18 ("[T]he prime purpose of the legislation was to aid the
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working population; that is, those
employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum
subsistence wage."); Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 48 (1943) ("The Fair Labor
Standards Act sought a reduction in hours to spread employment as well as to maintain health.");
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1941) ("[The purpose of the FLSA] is to exclude
from interstate commerce goods produced ... under conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standards of living necessary for health and general well-being; and to prevent the
use of interstate commerce as the means of.. . spreading and perpetuating such substandard labor
conditions among the workers of the several states.").
29. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Fair Labor
StandardsAct-Supreme Court Cases, 196 A.L.R. FED. 507, 522-23 (2004) (footnote omitted).
30. JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON WAGE & HOUR LAWS 13 (2d ed. 1990). When the FLSA

was enacted, the dominant economic theory held that employers would respond to being required
to pay overtime to employees by hiring more employees, thereby reducing the unemployment rate.
Although the actual effect on firm-level employment decisions was not as economists had
predicted, the FLSA greatly benefited working-class Americans through the provision of a
minimum wage and overtime pay.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). It is noteworthy that section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(b), 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000)), adopts and incorporates the enforcement provisions of the FLSA,
including the collective action provision of section 16(b). See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v.
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 167 (1989). Because courts have treated collective actions arising under
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or by the Secretary of Labor under section 16(c). 3 2 If the Secretary of
33
Labor brings an action, the employee's rights to sue are terminated.
Hence, an employee who wishes to file a complaint regarding FLSA's
minimum-wage or overtime requirements has two choices. The
employee may make a complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor (DOL), or the employee may file a lawsuit in state
court or in federal district court. The employee must file this lawsuit
within two years of the date the employer violated the law, or within
three years, if the employer committed a willful violation.34 In either a
section 16(b) or a section 16(c) action, recovery ordinarily includes the
amount of unpaid wages, an equal amount as liquidated damages, and, in
a section 16(b) action, a reasonable attorney's fee.3 5
The enforcement provisions prescribed by the FLSA, including private suits by individuals and suits by the Secretary of Labor, are
intended to serve important Congressional purposes:
First, the provisions are designed to secur[e] to employees restitution
of statutorily mandated wages. Thus, the FLSA ensures that individual employees will be compensated within the dictates of federal law.
Second, the enforcement sections ensure that violators are deprived
of the use of unlawfully withheld compensation . . . , thereby protect(ing) complying employers from the unfair wage competition of
the noncomplying employers. Third, the enforcement provisions
serve to deter future violations of the FLSA.36
B.

The Portal-to-PortalAmendments

When it was first enacted, the FLSA produced a tremendous
amount of litigation. Between July 1, 1946 and January 31, 1947, 1,913
"portal-to-portal ' 37 actions were filed under the FLSA. 38 The 1938 version of the FLSA "gave employees and their 'representatives' the right
to bring actions to recover amounts due under" the statute for minimum
wage and overtime pay on behalf of themselves and other employees
the FLSA and ADEA identically with regard to the notice issue and "similarly situated" inquiry,
no distinction will be drawn for purposes of this article.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
33. Id. § 216(b) ("The right provided by this subsection to bring an action by or on behalf of
any employee, and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall
terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an action under [29 U.S.C.

§ 217l ....).
34. Id. § 255(a).
35. Id. § 216.
36. Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1464 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Coach House Rest., Inc., 457
F. Supp. 946, 951-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
37. "Portal-to-Portal" represents employees' work day from starting time to quitting time.
38. 93 CONG. REC. 2082 (1947).
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"similarly situated."3 9 The statute specified no written-consent requirement for joinder. Courts, in interpreting the 1938 version of the FLSA,
construed the statute so as to encourage representative actions.'g

In 1947, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act41 "in response to
a 'national emergency' created by a flood of suits under the FLSA aimed
at collecting portal-to-portal pay allegedly due employees. 4 2 Noting
the "immensity of the [litigation] problem," Congress attempted to strike
a balance to maintain employees' rights while curbing the number of
lawsuits.4 3 The stated purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 was
"[tlo relieve employers from certain liabilities and punishments under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938." 44 Specifically, Congress determined that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 had
been interpreted judicially in disregard to long-established customs,
practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby
creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers with the results that, if said Act
as so interpreted or claims arising under such interpretations were
permitted to stand, (1) the payment of such liabilities would bring
39. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989); see also Culver v. Bell &
Loffland, Inc., 146 F.2d 29, 30 (9th Cir. 1944) (noting that employees could bring FLSA suit on
behalf of "employees similarly situated").
40. See, e.g., Prickett v. DeKalb County, 349 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) ("FLSA is a
remedial statute that has been construed liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with
congressional direction.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Culver, 146 F.2d at 31 ("The
provisions of the Act permitting resort to representative suits should be liberally administered by
the courts, since encouragement of the practice will redound to the advantage of employer and
employee alike through avoidance of a multiplicity of suits."); Barrett v. Nat'l Malleable & Steel
Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416 (W.D. Pa. 1946) ("Actions of this nature, which are commonly
termed 'representative suits,' should be liberally administered since it may be that other persons
interested in the same common question of law or facts might desire to join as party plaintiffs and
by the binder being permitted, a multiplicity of suits would be avoided and a litigious situation
would be corrected at one time."); Sham v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941)
("The [Fair Labor Standards Act] authorizes an employee to sue for himself 'and other employees
similarly situated.' It is very comprehensive and inclusive; it contains no restrictions other than
that the other employees be similarly situated .... Employees may be similarly situated without
being identically situated. The evident purpose of the Act is to provide one law suit in which the
claims of different employees, different in amount but all arising out of the same character of
employment, can be presented and adjudicated, regardless of the fact that they are separate and
independent of each other.").
41. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (1947).
42. Arrington v. NBC, 531 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1982) (footnote omitted); see also
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 v. Albertson's Inc., 207 F.3d 1193,
1200-01 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Arrington court's interpretation of Congress's intent in
enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act has been embraced by almost "all courts confronting the issue");
93 CONG. REc. 2087 (1947) ("The attention of the Senate is called to a dramatic influx of
litigation, involving vast alleged liability, which has suddenly entered the Federal courts of the
Nation.").
43. 93 CONG. REC. 2082 (1947).
44. Portal-to-Portal Act pmbl.
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about financial ruin of many employers and seriously impair the capital resources of many others, thereby resulting in the reduction of
industrial operations, halting of expansion and development, curtailing employment, and the earning power of employees; ...(7) the

courts of the country would be burdened with excessive and needless
litigation and champertous practices would be encouraged.4 5
The Portal-to-Portal Act amended section 16 of the FLSA in three ways.
First, it limited the parties who could bring suit under that statute.4 6
Specifically, section 16(b) was amended to limit "standing to pursue an
action for liability ...

to employees only. 47 According to the Eleventh

Circuit's review of the history of the Portal-to-Portal Amendments,
"[b]y identifying 'employees' as the only proper parties in a § 216(b)
action, the Portal to Portal Act aimed to ban representative actions that
previously had been brought by unions on behalf of employees. 4 8 Second, the Portal-to-Portal Amendments provided that for purposes of the
statute of limitations, a cause of action is commenced for unnamed
plaintiffs to a collective action when the plaintiff files written consent
with the court. 4 9 A member of the class who is not named in the complaint is not a party unless and until he affirmatively opts in to the
action, and the statute of limitations continues to run until written consent is filed with the court.50 Third, the Portal-to-Portal Amendments
created an opt-in requirement for employees seeking to join in a representative action under the FLSA.51 Specifically, the amendments provide that "[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. ' 5 2 Congress's aim in adding the "opt-in" language to section 16(b) "was to
prevent large group actions, with their vast allegations of liability, from
being brought on behalf of employees who had no real involvement in,
or knowledge of, the lawsuit."53 Thus, the 1947 amendments to the
45. Id. § 1(a).
46. See State of Nev. Employees' Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
Portal-to-Portal Act §5).
47. Albertson's, 207 F.3d at 1200.
48. Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1248 (1 lth Cir. 2003)
(citing Albertson's, 207 F.3d at 1200). The Cameron-Grantcourt further noted that the ban was
due to the "fear that unions, as representatives, were concretely benefiting from participation in
the FLSA suits." Id. (citing Albertson's, 207 F.3d at 1200).
49. § 7(b).
50. Scott Edward Cole & Matthew R. Bainer, To Certify or Not To Certify: A Circuit-byCircuit Primer on the Varying Standardsfor Class Certification in Actions Under the Federal
Labor Standards Act, 13 B.U. Pull. INT. L.J. 167, 169 (2004).
51. § 5(a).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
53. Arrington v. NBC, 531 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.D.C. 1982). The Arrington court then went
on to declare that "[t]he 'consent in writing' requirement ...[sought] to eradicate the problem of
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FLSA prohibit what precisely is advanced under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 23-a representative plaintiff filing an action on behalf
of uninvolved class members.5 4
Hence, Congress sought to limit the availability of representative
actions under the FLSA by limiting standing to employees only, provid-

ing for the continued running of the statute of limitations for putative
plaintiffs until they affirmatively opt in to the action, and imposing an
express obligation that plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively affirmatively opt in. While employees retain the option to proceed individually
or collectively under the FLSA, employees wishing to proceed collectively after the Portal-to-Portal Amendments are required to use the section 16(b) collective-action provisions; the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 class-action mechanism is not available as an alternative
mechanism.5 5
There are a number of important differences between Rule 23 class
actions and collective actions under the FLSA. First, the sole inquiry
under the FLSA statutory provision for a collective action is whether the
individuals seeking to be joined are "similarly situated." Comparatively,
under Rule 23, numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation are required.5 6 Second, as noted previously, FLSA collective actions are "opt-in" actions whereas Rule 23 actions are "optout" actions. Third, in FLSA collective actions, the statute of limitations
for any unnamed plaintiffs continues to run until written consent has
been filed with the court.57 Comparatively, under Rule 23, all individuals falling within the class definition are bound by any judgment unless
totally uninvolved employees gaining recovery as a result of some third party's action in filing
suit." Id. at 502.
54. See State of Nev. Employees' Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 1990); see
also Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (1 th Cir. 2003)
("(In contrast to Rule 23 class actions, the existence of a collective action under § 216(b) does
depend on the active participation of other plaintiffs. In other words, under § 216(b), the named
plaintiff does not have the fight to act in a role analogous to the private attorney general
concept.").
55. LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
("There is a fundamental, irreconcilable difference between the class action described by Rule 23
and that provided for by FLSA § 16(b).... It is crystal clear that § 16(b) precludes pure Rule 23
class actions in FLSA suits."); see also Cameron-Grant,347 F.3d at 1249 ("In light of the history
underlying the amendments to the FLSA, it is not surprising that § 216(b) is a fundamentally
different creature than the Rule 23 class action .... Under § 216(b), the action does not become a
Icollective' action unless other plaintiffs affirmatively opt into the class by giving written and
filed consent .... Thus, in contrast to Rule 23 class actions, the existence of a collective action
under § 216(b) does depend on the active participation of other plaintiffs."); Lusardi v. Lechner,
855 F.2d 1062, 1068 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Courts have generally recognized that Rule 23 class
actions may not be used under FLSA § 16(b).").
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 256.
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they affirmatively opt-out of the action, and the statute of limitations
ceases to run once the class action has been filed. One similarity, however, between Rule 23 class actions and collective actions under the
FLSA is the high degree of discretion granted to district courts in making the certification decision and otherwise managing the case. The
Eleventh Circuit has stated, "The decision to create an opt-in class under
§ 216(b), like the decision on class certification under Rule 23, remains
soundly within the discretion of the district court." 58 Nevertheless, the
statutory provision establishing the collective-action mechanism, unlike
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, provides little guidance to the courts
on the appropriate standards and procedures to be applied in making a
decision regarding certification.
Collective actions have played a major role in the enforcement of
the FLSA, providing a remedy for denial of minimum wages, over-time
pay, and pay for time actually worked. Collective actions have been
particularly important for victims of FLSA violations because "most
individual cases involve a limited amount of potential remedy, and victims who file FLSA complaints are particularly vulnerable to employer
retaliation. 5 9 The typical FLSA claim involving only a single plaintiff
or a small group of employees often does not present an economically
viable action.
Over the years, the courts and Congress have struggled to strike a
balance between the competing goals of the collective-action mechanism
under the FLSA. On the one hand, the collective-action enforcement
mechanism "allows ... plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs
to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources" ' 60 and may have an even
stronger deterrent effect on employers. Similarly, a collective-action
mechanism aids in goals of judicial efficiency by allowing for "resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact." 6' On the
other hand, the collective-action mechanism seeks to alleviate some burden on employers by requiring that plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively affirmatively opt in to the action and prohibiting individuals who
lack a personal interest in the proceeding from bringing an action on
58. Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001).
59. Douglas D. Scherer & Robert Belton, Introduction to the Symposium on Class and
Collective Actions in Employment Law, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 351, 351 (2006). It is
noteworthy that some courts have permitted FLSA plaintiffs fearing retaliation to sue

anonymously. See Doe v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that plaintiffs may sue anonymously in Fair Labor Standards Act collective action where plaintiffs
feared retaliation). Nevertheless, the ability to sue anonymously remains the exception rather than
the rule; a serious risk of retaliation on the part of employers remains a prevalent problem in the
context of FLSA litigation.
60. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989).
61. Id.
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behalf of an employee. The current state of the law of FLSA collective
actions is the result of amendments to the FLSA as enacted in 1938 and
various court rulings on the proper standards and procedures to be
applied to FLSA collective-action cases.
IV.

STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES APPLIED TO
CERTIFICATION DETERMINATIONS

The Collective Action provision of the FLSA provides, in relevant
part,
An action to recover [under the FLSA] may be maintained against
any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly

situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.62
This statutory provision has provided little guidance to courts, leaving
them to determine the appropriate standards and procedures for certification of collective actions. Prior to 1989, courts divided on two primary
issues: first, whether district courts had the power to authorize and facilitate notice to putative class members and second, if yes, in what cases
such notice would be appropriate. Because the collective-action provision established the requirement that putative plaintiffs affirmatively opt
in to an ongoing action, but failed to provide a means by which putative
plaintiffs could be notified of an ongoing action, much of the early litigation involved the first question of whether district courts had the
authority to facilitate notice to putative plaintiffs.63
A.

Do District Courts Have the Power To Authorize Notice?

Prior to 1989, the circuits were divided on the question of whether
district courts had the authority to issue an order authorizing notice to
"similarly situated" employees when such an order was sought by the
62. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
63. See e.g., David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions
Under the Fair Labor StandardsAct, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL' Y J. 129, 131 (2003) ("To opt in to
an ongoing section 216(b) action, employees must become aware of the action's existence.
However, unlike Rule 23, section 216(b) does not provide a procedure by which to notify potential
opt-in class members of their option to join an ongoing 216(b) case. Thus, much of the early
litigation under section 216(b) revolved around whether the parties or the court had the power to
send notice to potential opt-in'plaintiffs. The courts of appeals issuing decisions on that question
split evenly on the issue, with three circuits finding that the courts have the power to facilitate the
sending of notice, and three circuits ruling that courts could not facilitate the sending of notice.")
(footnote omitted).
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64
named plaintiff. This issue arose under both the FLSA and the ADEA.
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the question of
court-authorized notice in Hoffinann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling.65 The
Hoffmann-La Roche Court addressed the narrow question of "whether,
in an ADEA action, district courts may play any role in prescribing the
terms and conditions of communication from the named plaintiffs to the
potential members of the class on whose behalf the collective action has
been brought. '6 6 The Court held that district courts do have discretion
to facilitate notice to punitive plaintiffs in an ADEA action. 67 The Court
noted that Congress intended for employees to be able to proceed collectively under section 16(b) and explained its reasoning as follows:
The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding
of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity.
These benefits, however, depend on employees receiving accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective
action, so that they can make informed decisions about whether to
participate ....
Court authorization of notice serves the legitimate goal of avoiding a multiplicity of duplicative suits and setting cutoff dates to expedite disposition of the action .... By approving the form of notice
sent, the trial court could be assured that its cutoff date was reasonable, rather than having to set a cutoff date based on a series of unauthorized communications or even gossip that might have been
misleading.68
Although the Supreme Court's holding addressed only the narrow
question of the propriety of notice in ADEA (and not FLSA) collective
actions, this holding has been accepted as extending to the FLSA cases
as well.6 9 The same statutory provision is applied to collective actions

64. See Cole & Bainer, supra note 50, at 170 ("[M]any lower courts refused to sanction courtfacilitated notice in FLSA opt-in actions on the basis that, since Congress had not expressly
authorized distribution of such notice, the courts' contact of non-parties was tantamount to a
solicitation of claims. Other courts reasoned that Congress's silence on this issue permitted notice
in appropriate cases.") (footnote omitted). Compare United States v. Cook, 795 F.2d 987, 994
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (authorizing discovery of names and addresses of potential class members),
Woods v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing court-approved notice),
and Braunstein v. E. Photographic Labs, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(allowing court-authorized notice), with McKenna v. Champion Int'l Corp., 747 F.2d 1211, 1214
(8th Cir. 1984) (disapproving court-authorized notice), Dolan v. Project Constr. Corp., 725 F.2d
1263, 1267-69 (10th Cir. 1984) (same), and Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 864 (9th

Cir. 1977) (same).
65. 493 U.S. 165.

66. Id. at 169.
67. Id. at 170.
68. Id. at 170, 172.
69. See, e.g., Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D. Nev. 1999)

1206

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1191

under the ADEA and FLSA,7 ° and the rationale underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Hoffinann-La Roche appears equally germane to
ADEA and FLSA actions. 7 ' The Hoffinann-La Roche Court specifically
noted that part of the rationale underlying its holding that courts had
authority to provide notice to putative plaintiffs in ADEA actions was
that providing such notice serves the broad remedial goals of the
ADEA.7 2 Those broad remedial goals are shared by the FLSA.7 3
Two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffmann-La
Roche, the Eleventh Circuit expressly addressed the question of courtauthorized notice in the context of the FLSA in Dybach v. Florida
Department of Corrections.74 Without citing to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Hoffinann-La Roche, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the broad

remedial purpose of the [FLSA] is best served if the district court is
deemed to have the power to give such notice to other potential members of the plaintiff class to 'opt-in' if they so desire . . . under appropriate conditions.""5 In spite of the strong rationale underlying the grant of
judicial discretion in facilitating notice to a putative FLSA plaintiff
class, the Eleventh Circuit recognized, as had the Supreme Court in
Hoffinann-La Roche, that such judicial discretion is not without limits.76
("[T]he Supreme Court abrogated opinions such as Kinney Shoe insofar as they held that district
courts could not give notice to potential plaintiffs in a § 216(b) action.").
70. See supra note 31. Section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000), adopts and incorporates the enforcement provisions of the FLSA
including the collective action provision of § 216(b).
71. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 171 ("Because trial court involvement in the notice
process is inevitable in cases with numerous plaintiffs where written consent is required by statute,
it lies within the discretion of a district court to begin its involvement early, at the point of the
initial notice, rather than at some later time.").
72. See, e.g., id. at 173 ("Congress left intact the 'similarly situated' language providing for
collective actions, such as this one. The broad remedial goal of the statute should be enforced to
the full extent of its terms."); Dybach v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1991)
("[T]he broad remedial purpose of the Act is best served if the district court is deemed to have the
power to give such notice to other potential members of the plaintiff class to opt-in if they so
desire and by the district court's exercise of that power under appropriate conditions.") (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
73. See discussion supra pp. 9-12.
74. 942 F.2d 1562. The Eleventh Circuit had declined to make a determination on the notice
question in Haynes v. Singer Co., holding that even if district courts possessed the authority to
authorize notice in FLSA collective actions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding insufficient evidence to support the giving of notice. 696 F.2d 884, 888 (11 th Cir. 1983).
75. Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1567 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
76. See id. (providing that district courts have discretion to authorize notice "under
appropriate conditions"). "Before determining to exercise such power ... , the district court
should satisfy itself that there are other employees . . . who desire to 'opt-in' and who are
Isimilarly situated' with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions."
Id. at 1567-68; see also Hoffinann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174 ("Our decision does not imply that
trial courts have unbridled discretion in managing ADEA actions. Court intervention in the notice
process for case management purposes is distinguishable in form and function from the
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The court in Hoffman-La Roche specifically held that district courts have
discretion to authorize notice not in all, but only "in appropriate
cases." 77 Similarly, the Dybach court held that district courts have the
power to authorize notice "under appropriate conditions. '78 Neither the
Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit, however, provided guidance
regarding what standards and procedures trial courts were to apply in
determining what cases are "appropriate cases," or what procedures trial
courts should use for authorizing or issuing notice. In determining what
cases are "appropriate cases," "the primary question facing the courts
was deciding whether plaintiffs and potential opt-ins were 'similarly
situated.' ,,79
B.

Eleventh Circuit Standards and Proceduresfor CollectiveAction Certification

To understand the current state of the law of collective-action certi-

fication within the Eleventh Circuit, it is important to recognize what
questions remained to be addressed after the power of district courts to
authorize notice had been effectively resolved. Courts were left to
resolve two primary questions in the wake of Hoffinann-La Roche and
Dybach: (1) what procedures to apply to determining whether to certify
a collective action under the FLSA, 80 and (2) what standardsto apply in
determining when individuals are "similarly situated" under section
16(b). In the context of FLSA collective-action litigation, the distinction
between procedures and standards is difficult to maintain. In many
ways, the procedural mechanism employed by courts in making certification decisions dictates the standards applied to those decisions. Nevsolicitation of claims. In exercising the discretionary authority to oversee the notice-giving
process, courts must be scrupulous to respect judicial neutrality. To that end, trial courts must
take care to avoid even the appearance of judicial endorsement of the merits of the action.").
77. Hoffinann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169.
78. Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1567.
79. Borgen & Ho, supra note 63, at 132. Unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which
clearly sets forth and defines various requirements for certification, the collective-action provision
under the FLSA provides only that plaintiffs and those they seek to represent be "similarly
situated." See 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2000) ("An action to recover ... may be maintained against
any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction
by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees

similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.") (emphasis added).
80. That is, what procedures were district courts to follow when making the determination to
allow for court-authorized notice and grant permission for plaintiffs to proceed collectively? This
determination can be characterized as "procedures for collective-action certification." The
procedures for certification of collective actions can be analogized to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 class-action certification.
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ertheless, it is useful for purposes of analysis to distinguish between the
procedures and standards for certification.
1.

PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

In the absence of guidance from the statute or the Supreme Court,
trial courts initially applied two general procedural approaches to collective-action certification decisions."' One line of cases applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requirements, such as commonality and
typicality.8 2 The second line of cases, adopted by the majority of district
courts in making certification decisions, used a two-tiered ad hoc
approach, without reference to Rule 23 standards.8 3
The first court of appeals to expressly address the competing procedural approaches to be applied to collective-action certification was the
Fifth Circuit in Mooney v. Aramco Services Co. 84 In Mooney, the Fifth
Circuit surveyed the two methods that had been adopted by the lower
courts. Although the Mooney court ultimately declined "to decide
which, if either, of the competing methodologies should be employed in
making a[ ] ... class certification decision," the court provided an extensive explanation of each approach and held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in applying the two-tiered ad hoc approach." The
Mooney court provided an often-cited description of the two-tiered ad
hoc approach:
The first determination is made at the so-called "notice stage." At the
notice stage, the district court makes a decision-usually based only
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. TGF Precision Haircutters, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 753, 754 (S.D. Tex.
2004) (noting that there are two methods used to resolve the issue of whether potential plaintiffs
are "similarly situated," with the first method involving a two-stage class certification and the
second method treating the "similarly situated" inquiry as coextensive with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 class certification).
82. See Bayles v. American Medical Response of Colorado,Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Colo.

1996), which describes the three different approaches in those cases applying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23 requirements. The first such approach is a two-step procedure under which
representative plaintiffs must meet the commonality and typicality requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a). See id. at 1058-59. The second approach that has been taken by some
courts requires that plaintiffs meet all of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requirements. Id.
at 1060. The third approach, referred to as the "spurious class action" approach, requires that a
party show that one common question of fact or law existed among the class and that the members
of the class sought a common relief. Id. at 1064. However, under this approach, a court could
also refuse to certify a class where it would waste judicial resources or unfairly prejudice the party
opposing certification. Id. at 1065.
83. See, e.g., Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2001);
Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001); Mooney v. Aramco
Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1995); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 354
(D.N.J. 1987).
84. 54 F.3d 1207.
85. Id. at 1216.
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on the pleadings and any affidavits which have been submittedwhether notice of the action should be given to potential class
members.
Because the court has minimal evidence, this determination is
made using a fairly lenient standard, and typically results in "conditional certification" of a representative class. If the district court
"conditionally certifies" the class, putative class members are given
notice and the opportunity to "opt-in." The action proceeds as a representative action throughout discovery.
The second determination is typically precipitated by a motion
for "decertification" by the defendant usually filed after discovery is
largely complete and the matter is ready for trial. At this stage, the
court has much more information on which to base its decision, and
makes a factual determination on the similarly situated question. If
the claimants are similarly situated, the district court allows the representative action to proceed to trial. If the claimants are not similarly
situated, the district court decertifies the class, and the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice. 86
In 2001, in Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co.,8 7 the Eleventh Circuit "suggested" that district courts adopt the two-tiered ad hoc
approach to certification as described by the Fifth Circuit in Mooney v.
Aramco Services Co., stating that this methodological approach provides
'
an effective tool for "managing these often complex cases." 88
However,
the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion that district courts adopt the two-tiered
ad hoc approach was merely a suggestion, and the court noted that
"[n]othing in our circuit precedent

. . .

requires district courts to utilize

this approach. The decision to create an opt-in class under § 216(b)...
remains soundly within the discretion of the district court." 8 9 Hence,
district courts were left with minimal assistance and a great deal of discretion on the procedures to be applied to collective-action certification.
This procedural discretion to adopt the two-tiered approach, or any other
procedural approach the district court finds appropriate in making a certification decision, has the potential to greatly influence the outcome of
individual cases. However, in practice, nearly all district courts have
accepted the Eleventh Circuit's recommendation that they adopt the
two-tiered approach.
86. Id. at 1213-14 (footnote omitted). The quoted language of Mooney provides guidance
with respect to both the procedure (two stage procedural approach requiring plaintiff to file the
initial motion for conditional certification and defendant to later move for decertification) and the
standards (proscribing a "relatively lenient" standard at the early notice stage and a somewhat
more stringent standard at the later decertification stage after discovery is largely complete).
87. 252 F.3d 1208.
88. Id. at 1219.
89. Id.
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The two-tiered approach provides a means by which district courts
can more effectively manage often complex FLSA collective actions by
allowing district courts to become involved in managing these cases at
an early stage. 90 The two-tiered nature of this approach permits courts
to raise the evidentiary burden placed on plaintiffs seeking to proceed
collectively during the course of litigation, as information becomes
available through discovery. Specifically, during the initial "notice
stage," when plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to conduct substantial discovery that would permit them to establish a high degree of similarity between themselves and those they seek to represent, the
evidentiary burden is intended to be relatively low. After discovery is
largely completed and plaintiffs have had an adequate opportunity to
discover evidence of similarity between themselves and those they seek
to represent, the burden is more stringent. Ultimately, however, outcomes in the application of the two-tiered approach depend upon how
courts define the statutory "similarly situated" requirement-a requirement that must be met at each stage of the two-tiered approach, although
the burden varies from one stage to the other.
2.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SIMILARLY

SITUATED" STANDARD

Early Eleventh Circuit case law on the appropriate standard for
determining when putative plaintiffs are "similarly situated" occurred
outside the context of the two-tiered procedural mechanism ultimately
"suggested" by the Eleventh Circuit and adopted by a majority of district
courts within the Eleventh Circuit. Nevertheless, the standards set forth
in these early cases have managed to fit within the two-tiered procedural
approach with relatively minimal modification. 9 1
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the appropriate standard for
determining whether individuals are "similarly situated" for purposes of
90. As the Supreme Court noted in Hoffinann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171

(1989),
[b]ecause trial court involvement in the notice process is inevitable in cases with
numerous plaintiffs where written consent is required by statute, it lies within the
discretion of a district court to begin its involvement early, at the point of the initial
notice .... One of the most significant insights that skilled trial judges have gained
in recent years is the wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention in the
management of litigation.
91. Although pre-Hipp decisions by the Eleventh Circuit regarding the standards for
collective-action certification addressed the "similarly situated" inquiry generally, the Eleventh
Circuit subsequently recognized that the more lenient standard applied in these earlier cases was
intended to be applied to the earlier stages of litigation. See Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d
945, 952 (11th Cir. 2007) ("In Hipp, we followed Grayson, but we also acknowledged, albeit
somewhat implicitly, that the lenient standard we adopted in the Grayson opinion may be most
useful when making a certification decision early in the litigation before discovery has been
completed.").
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collective-action certification in 1991 in Dybach v. Florida Department
of Corrections.9 2 The Dybach court, after recognizing the authority of
district courts to facilitate notice to putative plaintiffs, held that, before
facilitating notice, "the district court should satisfy itself that there are
other employees ... who desire to 'opt-in' and who are 'similarly situated' with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay
provisions." 93 Although district courts would have to wait until 2001 for
guidance from the Eleventh Circuit on the appropriate procedures to be
applied to collective-action certification,94 the Dybach requirements, that
(1) there are other employees who desire to opt in and (2) that those
employees are similarly situated, have come to play a prominent role in
certification decisions by district courts within the Eleventh Circuit.9 5
The Eleventh Circuit returned to the question of the appropriate
standards to be applied to the "similarly situated" inquiry in 1996 in
Grayson v. K Mart Corp.,96 an ADEA case. The court in Grayson held
that "the 'similarly situated' requirement of § 216(b) is more elastic and
less stringent than the requirements found in Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule
[A] unified policy, plan, or scheme of discrimina42 (severance) ....
tion may not be required to satisfy the more liberal 'similarly situated'
requirement of § 216(b)." 97
The court continued:
For an opt-in class to be created under section 216(b), an
employee need only show that he is suing his employer for himself
and on behalf of other employees "similarly situated." Plaintiffs need
92. 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 1567-68. For purposes of modem analysis of collective-action certification, the
essential element taken from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Dybach is the two-part burden
placed upon plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively under the FLSA: (1) Plaintiffs must
establish that there are others who desire to opt in to the action, and (2) Plaintiffs must establish
that those individuals falling within the class definition are "similarly situated" with respect to job
requirements and pay provisions. Id.
94. See Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219.
95. See Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1568 ("[W]e leave it to the district court to establish the specific
procedures to be followed with respect to such possible 'opting-in.'").
96. 79 F.3d 1086 (11 th Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 1095. The rule allowing for joinder found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20
provides that
[All] [p]ersons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:
(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20. The requirement for severance found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42
provides that, "[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court
may: join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions." FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
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show only that their positions are similar, not identical, to the positions held by the putative class members.
.. . [P]laintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating a "reasonable
basis" for their claim of class-wide discrimination. The plaintiffs
may meet this burden, which is not heavy, by making substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendant's affidavits
to the contrary. 98
These standards provided minimal clarification on the question of what
standards should be applied to collective-action certifications. While the
Grayson court provided some explanation of what level of similarity
was not necessary, 99 the court provided little guidance as to what was
sufficient to satisfy the "similarly situated" requirement, stating only that
the burden is "not heavy" and may be met by "substantial allegations of
class-wide discrimination," a requirement that is not easily paralleled to
the FLSA context, where discrimination is not a relevant component.
Hence, particularly in the context of FLSA certification decisions, district courts were provided very little direction regarding what standards
to apply to conditional-certification decisions.
The Eleventh Circuit next returned to the question of the standards
for determining whether plaintiffs are "similarly situated" in 2001 in
Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co.'
The Hipp court, in
describing the two-tiered approach to certification of collective actions,
provided that the standard to be applied at the notice stage is a "fairly
lenient standard" and implied that the standard to be applied at the later
decertification stage is more stringent, because the court (and the parties) has significantly more information upon which to make its determination.' 01 The court also quoted the standard for "similarly situated" it
had set forth in Grayson v. K Mart Corp., clarifying the continued validity of that standard as applied to the two-tiered approach.' 0 2
98. Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1096-97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The
'similarly situated' requirement, in turn, is considerably less stringent than the requirement of
[Rule 23(b)(3)] that common questions 'predominate,' or presumably, the Rule 20(a) requirement
that claims 'arise out of the same action or occurrence." Id. at 1096 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flavel v. Svedala Indus. Inc., 875 F. Supp. 550, 553
(E.D. Wis. 1994)).
99. The Grayson court, in holding that "the 'similarly situated' requirement of § 216(b) is...
less stringent than" that for joinder under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials under Rule 42(b),
essentially established an illusory bar at or below that required for joinder and separate trials
without providing any guidance to trial courts as to how much lower the bar truly is. Id. at 1095
(emphasis added).
100. 252 F.3d 1208 (11 th Cir. 2001); see also discussion supra Part IV.B.I.
101. 252 F.3d at 1218.
102. Id. at 1219. Specifically, the Hipp court stated,
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In 2007, the Eleventh Circuit again had occasion to address the
appropriate standards to be applied to certification determinations in
Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc."°3 In addressing the appellant-employees'
reliance on the standards for certification set forth in Hipp and Grayson,
the Eleventh Circuit expressly noted what had been implied in Hipp, that
the more lenient standard set forth in Grayson'°4 ought to be applied to
the earlier notice stage. The Anderson court also addressed the appropriate standard to be applied at the second stage of collective-action certification, the "decertification" stage.'I 5 Specifically, the court held that the
district court had not abused its discretion in granting the defendants'
motions for decertification and stated,
The "similarly situated" standard at the second stage is less "lenient"
than at the first, as is the plaintiffs' burden in meeting the standard.
Exactly how much less lenient we need not specify, though logically
the more material distinctions revealed by the evidence, the more
likely the district court is to decertify the collective action.
We also need not specify how plaintiffs' burden of demonstrating that a collective action is warranted differs at the second stage. It
is sufficient to conclude, again quite logically, that at the second
stage plaintiffs may-the ultimate decision rests largely within the
district court's discretion-not succeed in maintaining a collective
action under § 216(b) based solely on allegations and affidavits,
the evidence presented by the party seeking
depending upon
06
decertification.
To an even greater degree than had been true with prior cases, the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of the appropriate standards to be applied to
collective-action certification in Anderson left wide discretion to district
courts in making the determination to conditionally certify or later
This Court expressed its view of the similarly situated requirement in Grayson:
"[T]he 'similarly situated' requirement of § 216(b) is more elastic and less stringent
than the requirements found in Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule 42 (severance). [A]
unified policy, plan, or scheme of discrimination may not be required to satisfy the
more liberal 'similarly situated' requirement of § 216(b). [Pllaintiffs bear the
burden of demonstrating a reasonable basis for their claim of classwide
discrimination. The plaintiffs may meet this burden, which is not heavy, by making
substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations
supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendants' affidavits to the
contrary."
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
103. 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007).
104. Specifically, the court stated that the plaintiffs need only "demonstrat[e] a 'reasonable
basis' for their claim of class-wide discrimination ... by making substantial allegations of classwide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations supported by affidavits which 'successfully
engage defendants' affidavits to the contrary."' Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097.
105. 488 F.3d at 953.
106. Id. (citation omitted).
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decertify a collective action. Thus, at present, district courts have wide
discretion and very limited direction both as to the procedures and standards to apply when making a certification determination under the
FLSA.
A review of the preceding case law in the Eleventh Circuit makes
clear that district courts hold a great deal of discretion with respect to
both the procedures and standards applied to collective-action certification. Following the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion in Hipp that district
courts adopt the two-tiered ad hoc approach, nearly all subsequent district court rulings on motions for certification of collective actions under
07
the FLSA have followed this procedural approach to certification.1
Hence, while discretion exists as to the procedure for collective-action
certification, it has created little problem with regards to predictability
because district courts within the Eleventh Circuit appear to universally
apply the same procedural approach. However, the standards applied at
each of the two stages of the two-tiered approach have not shown the
same level of uniformity.
Given the wide degree of discretion and limited direction provided
to district courts, rulings on motions for collective-action certification at
the notice and decertification stages tend to vary widely and be highly
fact specific. The discretion left to district courts and absence of clear
standards in making the "similarly situated" determination seems to
result in an apparent disconnect between actual rulings on motions for
certification and the theoretical framework and competing goals upon
which those rulings purport to be based. An examination of a sample of
district court rulings reveals very few trends: District courts focus on
varying factors and require varying quanta of evidence from plaintiffs
seeking to proceed collectively. The result is an absence of predictability in this area of the law and, under some courts' standards, the potential for the complete evisceration of FLSA plaintiffs' ability to proceed
collectively.
V.

DISTRICT COURT RULINGS

An examination of some of the rulings on motions for certification
at the "notice stage" by district courts in the Eleventh Circuit is informative in understanding how district courts have dealt with motions for
certification of collective actions and how application of a uniform procedure, where there is an absence of definite rules and standards, often
results in highly disparate outcomes. Although district courts in the
Eleventh Circuit have uniformly applied the two-tiered approach to cer107. See, e.g., Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1243 n.2
("Since Hipp, the district courts in our circuit have utilized the two-tiered approach ....
).
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tification decisions, purporting to apply a more lenient standard at the
notice stage and a somewhat more stringent standard after the parties
have had an opportunity for discovery, outcomes have varied widely
from case to case. Some courts have granted motions for conditional
certification on the pleadings and affidavits of named plaintiffs alone
while others have found even numerous affidavits from other employees
seeking to join insufficient to overcome what has been called a minimal
burden at the notice stage.
Although most district courts have required that, at the notice stage,
plaintiffs seeking conditional certification show that (1) there are other
employees who desire to opt into the action and (2) the employees who
desire to opt in are "similarly situated," these requirements appear to
lack uniform definition. An examination of rulings by district courts
reveals little in the way of a pattern or standard. The sections that follow examine how district courts have analyzed and applied each of the
two requirements at the notice stage and draw some conclusions about
the current state of the law of collective actions under the FLSA within
the Eleventh Circuit.
A.

Other Employees Desire To Opt In

Many district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have denied
motions for conditional certification and court-authorized notice on the
ground that the plaintiff seeking conditional certification failed to satisfy
the first element set forth in Dybach: that other employees desire to opt
in to the action. 10 8 The Eleventh Circuit in Dybach stated only that "the
district court should satisfy itself that there are other employees of the
department-employer who desire to 'opt-in' ";1°9 it did not set a standard
for a requisite number of employees or percentage of the total class that
must be shown desirous of opting in to the collective action. Nevertheless, some courts have read a sort of numerosity" o requirement into this
language. I I Other courts have found the pleadings and affidavits of the
named plaintiffs and affidavits or consents to join from a small number
108. Dybach v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1991).
109. Id.
110. Analogy can be made here to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1), which requires,
for class actions under that rule, that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
111. Nevertheless, those courts that have imposed a "numerosity" requirement have not stated
any rationale for the ultimate determination that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden. These
courts have expressed neither a percentage nor otherwise expressed a quantum of proof necessary
to overcome the plaintiffs burden. The simultaneous acknowledgement that some burden exists
coupled with a refusal to identify how it might be measured can be analogized to Justice Potter
Stewart's oft-quoted statement regarding the legal definition of obscenity: "I know it when I see it
....
Jacobellis
.
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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of other employees sufficient to overcome plaintiff's burden
of showing
12

that other employees desire to opt in at the notice stage."
In Robinson v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the magistrate judge issued a

Report and Recommendation denying the plaintiff's motion for an order
permitting court-supervised notice to employees of their opt-in rights.113
The court, addressing the two elements that comprise the plaintiff's burden at the notice stage, found that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome either burden." 4 Although the plaintiff in
Robinson provided affidavits of herself and two other former employees
as well as notices of consent to join by those two employees, the court
determined that the plaintiff failed to establish that there were sufficient
employees who desire to opt in to the action.'" 5 While acknowledging
that at the notice stage "courts apply a lenient standard, requiring a

plaintiff to show only that similarly situated persons exist that may wish
to join the suit,"1" 6 the court ultimately determined that the plaintiff,
who had filed affidavits of three employees, had failed to satisfy the first
prong under Dybach that there were other employees who desired to
"opt-in" to the action.' 17 The court further stated that "[t]he bottom line
is that only three employees out of a potential class of the 58,000 nationwide hourly employees employed by Defendant at any given time and

the 26,000 employed in Florida filed affidavits to support Plaintiff's
request for conditional certification."" 8
112. See, e.g., Tyler v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-33-F, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31682, at *7-8 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2005) (five consents to join were sufficient to establish that
others desired to opt in); Pendlebury v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 04-80521-CIV, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 574, at *4, *12 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2005) (plaintiffs allegations and four affidavits by
employees indicating that others desired to opt in were sufficient); Bell v. Mynt Entm't, LLC, 223
F.R.D. 680, 682 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (seven affidavits by employees with specific allegations of wage
violations were sufficient).
113. No. 5:06-cv-122-Oc-IOGRJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85471, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13,
2006).
114. Id. at *24.
115. Id. at *14-15, *19.
116. Id. at *12.
117. Id. at *24.
118. Id. at *19. The court also stated,
Defendant-on the other hand-through the filing of twenty declarations of the
Dolgencorp officers, district managers, store managers, assistant store managers,
lead clerks and store clerks/sales associates, identifies a substantial segment of the
potential class of employees who have no desire to join the lawsuit and who allege
that they never observed any overtime violations during the time period at issue.
Id. at *20. Ultimately, the court concluded,
[E]ven assuming arguendo that the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff were considered
sufficient to establish that there are other employees who might be interested in
joining in a collective action, the Court nonetheless, concludes that the Plaintiff has
also failed to establish that a class of other ... employees is similarly situated to the
Plaintiff, as required under the second prong of Dybach.
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Comparatively, in Bell v. Mynt Entertainment, LLC, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the
plaintiffs' renewed motion for court-ordered notification, finding seven
affidavits from the current-named plaintiffs sufficient to overcome the
plaintiffs' burden at the notice stage."1 9 Each of the seven affidavits
submitted with the motion for conditional certification set forth details
of the hours each affiant worked each week, hourly pay, and the procedures comprising the alleged FLSA violation. The affiants "also
claim[ed] to be familiar with other similarly-situated" employees who
would be interested in joining the litigation.' 20 The court held that
"[t]hese affidavits contain sufficiently detailed allegations to demonstrate a reasonable basis for the plaintiffs' claim of classwide discrimination." 1 2' The factual allegations included in the affidavits in Bell
initially appear quite similar to those contained in the affidavits submitted in Robinson. However, the allegations contained in the affidavits in
Robinson were described as "conclusory" and "[w]ithout any explanation of whether a company or store wide policy was involved."' 122 Nevertheless, even where the submitted affidavits can be distinguished with
regards to content contained therein, the content goes to the second
prong of Dybach, and the Robinson court specifically focused on the
number of affidavits filed by the plaintiffs in reaching its determination
that conditional certification was due to be denied.' 23
In Rivera v. Cemex, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida granted the plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification and permission to send court-supervised notice to similarly
situated employees of their opt-in rights. 124 In Rivera, the plaintiff "submitted his own affidavit and the affidavit of three additional former
employees" of the defendant-employer, all alleging that they had not
been paid over-time pay as required by the FLSA. 2 5 The court held that
the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence to overcome his burden at
26
the notice stage. 1
Id. at *21.
119. 223 F.R.D. 680, 682 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
120. Id. at 683.
121. Id.
122. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85471, at *15.
123. See id. at * 19 ("The bottom line is that only three employees out of a potential class of the
58,000 nation-wide hourly employees employed by Defendant at any given time and the 26,000
employed in Florida filed affidavits to support Plaintiff's request for conditional certification.").
124. No. 6:06-cv-687-Orl-3IDAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84557, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21,
2006).
125. Id. at *5.
126. Id.; see also Robbins-Pagel v. WM. F. Puckett, Inc., No. 6:05-cv- 1582-Orl-31 DAB, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85253, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2006) ("Plaintiff has submitted her own
affidavit and the affidavits of two additional former employees of Defendant. All three affidavits
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Similarly, in Tyler v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied the plaintiffs'
motion for certification of a collective action and authorization to send
nationwide and international notice to putative plaintiff class members,
but concluded that three valid consents to join were sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs' burden of demonstrating that other employees desire
to opt in to the action.' 2 7 It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs in Tyler, like
the plaintiff in Robinson, sought nationwide and international notice.
However, unlike the Robinson court, the Tyler court did not impose a
numerosity requirement based on the total size of the proposed class. In
fact, the Tyler court never even addressed the size of the proposed class
in its discussion of the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that
others desire to opt in to the action, other than to mention that the plaintiffs sought nationwide and international notice.
In Rodgers v. CVS Pharmacy,Inc., the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida denied the plaintiff's motion for conditional certification for several reasons, including that the plaintiff had
failed to establish the existence of other employees who desired to opt in
to the lawsuit.' 28 Like the plaintiff in Robinson, the plaintiff in Rodgers
only filed his own declaration and affidavits of two employees who
worked at a different location. 29 The court held that "Plaintiff has
failed to provide sufficient evidence that there are other employees who
desire to opt in to this action, other than the two who have filed consents. . . . The significance of this number is drastically minimized
when compared to the 250,000 [putative class members sought to be
represented]."' 30 Again, the court appears to have placed a sort of
numerosity requirement on the plaintiff seeking to proceed collectively.
allege that the employees were not paid over-time pay as required by the FLSA .... Plaintiff has
submitted sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis to believe that there are similarly
situated individuals who may be interested in joining the action, if given notice.") (citation
omitted).
127. No. 2:05-cv-33-F, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31682, at *8, *20 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2005).
The Tyler court reasoned,
[h]ere, while it is unknown what percentage of potential plaintiffs might wish to
participate, Tyler points out that five other Payless employees have filed consents to
sue pending before this Court, and this is evidence that at least some potential
plaintiffs are interested in joining the suit. Though two of these potential plaintiffs
were not employed during the relevant period, three other potential plaintiffs remain
prepared to join this suit ....
[Thus,] the Court concludes that Tyler has sufficiently
demonstrated at this stage of the proceedings that other persons desire to join in the

suit.
Id. at *7-8 (citation omitted).
128. No. 8:05-CV-770-T-27MSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23272, at *20-21 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
22, 2006).
129. See id. at *10.
130. Id. at *14.
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In Barten v. KTK & Associates, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification and permission to send court-supervised notice
for failure to satisfy the first prong of Dybach.'3 ' In support of their
motion for conditional certification, the plaintiffs filed affidavits and
consents to join from two additional employees and declarations from
three of the named plaintiffs stating that they had friends who were
employees and were afraid to join the FLSA suit for fear of retaliation.' 32 The court noted that "[c]ertification of a collective action and
notice to a potential class is not appropriate to determine whether there
are others who desire to join the lawsuit. Rather, a showing that others
desire to opt in is required before certification and notice will be authorized by the court."' 133 The court then held that the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy their burden of demonstrating that other employees desired to opt
in to the lawsuit. 134
This principle that "certification of a collective action and notice to
a potential class is not appropriate to determine whether there are others
who desire to join the lawsuit" has been expressed by numerous district
courts in denying motions for conditional certification of collective
actions. 3 5 While in theory the requirement placed on plaintiffs to make
some showing that other employees exist who desire to opt in to the
action is rational, in application, particularly in the context of nationwide
and international collective actions, and where courts require plaintiffs
to meet a more stringent burden, this requirement seems in many ways
to create a "Catch-22" for employees seeking to proceed collectively.
In cases such as Robinson v. Dolgencorp, Inc. and Rodgers v. CVS
Pharmacy, where the court placed a sort of "numerosity" requirement
and mandated that the plaintiff offer "detailed allegations supported by
affidavits which successfully engage defendants' affidavits to the contrary," 1 36 plaintiffs have limited chance for success in seeking conditional certification.' 3 7 The information disparity between the plaintiff131. No. 8:06-CV-1574-T-27EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54068, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 24,
2007).
132. Id. at *2-3.
133. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
134. Id. at *7 ("A plaintiff's belief in the existence of other employees who desire to opt in and
unsupported expectations that additional plaintiffs will subsequently come forward are insufficient
to justify certification of a collective action and notice to a potential class.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135. See, e.g., id. at *6; Mackenzie v. Kindred Hosp. E., L.L.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1220
(M.D. Fla. 2003).
136. Rodgers v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-770-T-27MSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23272, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2006) (quoting Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097
(11 th Cir. 1996)).
137. Laura L. Ho, Class and Collective Actions in Employment Law, 10 EMP. Rrs. & EMP.
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employee and the defendant-employer at this stage of the litigation is
usually quite large. On one hand, the defendant, as employer, has ready
access to officers, managers, and current and past employees from
whom it can obtain declarations alleging no desire on the part of
employees to opt in to the collective action and challenging the existence of FLSA violations. On the other hand, particularly where the
plaintiffs are seeking to represent a nationwide or international class of
employees, plaintiff-employees are limited in their ability to obtain evidence regarding whether other employees desire to opt in by discovery
rules, the ineffectiveness of notice issued without court authorization,
and, to a limited extent, ethical rules prohibiting solicitation of clients.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that "[p]arties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonpriviliged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense . . . . For good cause, the court may
order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action." '38 Further, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) no
discovery may be conducted prior to the initial meeting of counsel. 13 9
Because the statute of limitations continues to run on FLSA claims for
each individual employee until he affirmatively opts in to the action by
filing a consent with the court, 1 40 plaintiffs generally file a motion for
conditional certification almost immediately after filing the complaint.
"In this scenario, [the parties will not be able to conduct discovery]
before the hearing date on the certification motion." 14 Further, even if
the parties were able to conduct discovery prior to such a ruling, the
scope of discovery would be limited to the individual action brought by
the plaintiff, unless the court expressly expanded the scope of discovery,
hence making discovery of the names and contact information of other
employees sought to be represented outside the scope of discovery.
A collective action under the FLSA, whether initially filed as a collective action or certified by later motion to proceed collectively, does
not become a collective action until the court has certified it as such and
other employees affirmatively opt in to the action. As the Eleventh CirPOL'Y J. 427, 429 (2006) ("However, where plaintiffs cast too broad a net in defining employees
who are similarly situated or do not sufficiently support their allegation that plaintiffs are similarly
situated, courts do not hesitate to limit the scope of the notice or deny notice altogether.").
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
139. Specifically, Rule 26(d)(1) states that "[a] party may not seek discovery from any source
before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from
initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(l)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by
court order."
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000). A two-year statute of limitations was created for actions
to enforce FLSA, the Walsh Healey Act, and the Davis-Bacon Act (a 1966 amendment that
permits actions for willful violations to be brought within three years).
141. Aashish Y. Desai, The Discovery Problem, 44 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 10, 10 (2002).
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cuit noted in Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Services, "§ 216(b)
is a fundamentally different creature than the Rule 23 class action....
Under § 216(b), the action does not become a 'collective' action unless
other plaintiffs affirmatively opt into the class by giving written and
filed consent."' 4 2 The nature of the collective-action mechanism under
the FLSA affects the ability of plaintiffs to obtain information through
discovery. On the question of discovery in the context of FLSA collective actions, Laura L. Ho observes,
The most important and most pressing discovery plaintiffs must
take is the discovery of names and addresses of similarly situated
potential plaintiffs. Such discovery allows plaintiffs to notify similarly situated employees of the action and of their opportunity to join.
There are two ways plaintiffs can obtain the names and
addresses of potential plaintiffs. First, plaintiffs can seek court supervised notice sent to potential plaintiffs ... which, if the court agrees,
usually results in a list of names and addresses being disclosed to
plaintiffs' counsel. Second, names
and addresses may be obtained in
43
advance of the notice motion. 1
With regard to the second alternative recognized by Ho, specifically,
seeking discovery of the names and addresses of employees sought to be
represented prior to the initial conditional-certification decision, some
courts have granted such motions.' 4 Nevertheless, the ability of plaintiffs to obtain discovery of the names and contact information for members of the putative plaintiff class prior to conditional certification
remains indeterminate.
The Supreme Court, in Hoffinann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, in
affirming the district court's grant of discovery of the names and
addresses of putative plaintiff class members, reasoned,
Without pausing to explore alternative bases for the discovery, for
instance that the employees might have knowledge of other discoverable matter, we find it suffices to say that the discovery was relevant
to the subject matter of the action and that there were no grounds to
limit the discovery under the facts and circumstances of this case.' 45
Although the majority's ruling on the discovery question was a point of
contention for Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion, 46 the Court's
142. 347 F.3d 1240, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).
143. Ho, supra note 139, at 431-32.
144. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 01-545, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1363, at
*6-7 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (granting discovery of the names and contact information of
potential class members and holding that such pre-certification discovery does not require as a
condition precedent a finding that plaintiffs are "similarly situated" and that such disclosure does
not "constitute unwarranted or unreasonable invasion of privacy").
145. 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989).
146. Justice Scalia urged,
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holding on this issue appears bound by the facts and procedural posture
presented in that case.' 47 Further, as subsequent district court decisions
on similar discovery questions have noted, the Hoffmann-La Roche
Court ultimately left the determination of whether discovery of the
names and addresses of putative plaintiffs is appropriate in the sound

discretion of district courts.

48

Hence, plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively may not be entitled to discovery of the names and last available addresses of employees
falling within the proposed class until the collective action has been conditionally certified or until the court orders such discovery. In this situation, when combined with the requirement that the plaintiff seeking
conditional certification successfully engage the defendant's affidavits

in opposition, plaintiffs are set up to lose. Courts imposing such
requirements are basically creating a "Catch-22"' 149 for individuals seek[T]he discovery order, was invalid because the purpose for which it was issued was
not a purpose permitted by Rule 26....
The discovery order here had nothing to do with "the subject matter involved
in the pending action," in the plainly intended sense of constituting, or "lead[ing] to
the discovery of," admissible evidence. To the contrary, it was entered by the
District Court solely to "facilitate notice of an ADEA suit to absent class members,"
and was sustained by the Third Circuit as an exercise of "the authority of the district
court in an ADEA action to facilitate joinder of the putative class members."
Discovery for that purpose is simply not authorized.
Id. at 179-80 (last alteration in original) (citations omitted).
147. Specifically, the Court stated that the discovery was "relevant to the subject matter of the
action." Id. at 170 (emphasis added). However, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)
the scope of discovery is limited to matters relevant to the claim or defense of any party unless
the court "[f]or good cause" exercises its discretion to extend the scope of discovery to include
"any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
(emphasis added). The district court in Hoffmann-La Roche had exercised its discretion to expand
the scope of discovery to include those matters relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.
148. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Chiles Offshore Corp., No. 92-1504, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17844, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1992) ("Unfortunately, the [Hoffmann-La Roche] Court
provided little guidance to future courts faced with the same issues. The Court's only criteria were
that 'the discovery was relevant to the subject matter of the action and that there were no grounds
to limit the discovery under the facts and circumstances of this case.' In fact, the Court was
careful to emphasize that the main issue was 'the existence of the trial court's discretion, not the
details of its exercise."' (quoting Hoffiann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170)) (citations omitted).
149. A "Catch-22" describes an illogical or paradoxical situation in which one is trapped by
contradictory requirements. As author Joseph Heller described in his novel, Catch-22,
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for
one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the
process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do
was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly
more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if
he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to;
but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to.
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, 46 (Simon & Schuster 2004) (1955).
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ing to proceed collectively: If plaintiffs want to obtain conditional certification, they must have access to discovery of the names and contact
information of those who may desire to opt in, but in order to obtain
discovery of this information, plaintiffs are obligated to satisfy the
requirements of conditional certification.
Even where courts exercise their discretion in granting discovery of
the names and addresses of employees falling within the proposed class
definition prior to conditional certification, 5 0 the plaintiff is left to contact employees without the aid of the court (i.e., court-authorized
notice). This may pose additional barriers for plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively and may not result in a response that is representative
of those truly desiring to participate in the collective action. The Hoffmann-La Roche Court, in acknowledging the power of district courts to
authorize notice to putative plaintiffs under appropriate circumstances,
noted,
By monitoring preparation and distribution of the notice, a court can
ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative. Both the parties
and the court benefit from settling disputes about the content of the
notice before it is distributed. This procedure may avoid the need to
cancel consents obtained in an improper manner.'15
Communications made directly by the plaintiffs attorney, without
authority of the court, may not contain accurate information and may not
yield a response that is truly representative of those employees who
desire to opt in to the litigation. Putative plaintiffs may dismiss communications directly from the plaintiff's attorney as solicitations, while
communications from the court are likely to be deemed more trustworthy, more urgent, and more accurate.' 52
Further, plaintiffs' attorneys must proceed with caution in engaging
in pre-certification communications with putative plaintiffs, as courts
may limit such communications or even sanction certain communications. For instance, in Maddox v. Knowledge Learning Corp., the
150. Indeed, some courts have permitted limited discovery to allow a plaintiff to gather
evidence necessary to support a motion for conditional certification. See, e.g., Wombles v. Title
Max of Ala., Inc., No. 3:03cvl 158-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34733, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 7,
2005) (noting the court's previous grant of limited discovery on the issues of regional class notice
and collective-action status).
151. Hoffinann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172.
152. See id. at 171. The Hoffinann-La Roche Court noted,

We have recognized that a trial court has a substantial interest in communications
Observing that
that are mailed for single actions involving multiple parties ....
class actions serve important goals but also present opportunities for abuse, we
[have] noted that because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty
and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter
appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and the parties.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1224

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1191

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered
that the plaintiff-employees correct precertification statements that were
factually inaccurate, unbalanced, or misleading.1 53 The court held that
"it would be an abuse of discretion to totally proscribe plaintiffs in a
Section 216(b) collective action from communicating with potential
class members . . . prior to conditional certification .... [But] it is within
the court's discretion to prohibit the plaintiffs from issuing pre-certification statements that are factually inaccurate, unbalanced, or misleading."' 54 Hence, plaintiffs may not only face the potential risk that many
putative plaintiffs will summarily disregard communications lacking
court approval, but also the risk that the court may find such communications to be misleading, inaccurate, or unbalanced and hence subject to
limitation.
Finally, although the potential effects are relatively minimal, ethical
rules may limit the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to communicate
directly with putative plaintiffs.155 Most jurisdictions do not prohibit
mere communication with putative plaintiffs to a class action where the
56
communication does not constitute solicitation for pecuniary gain.1
153. 499 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
154. Id.; see also Taylor v. CompUSA, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-718-WBH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14520, at *12 (N.D. Ga. June 29, 2004) (holding that until the court ruled on conditional
certification and approved official notice, the plaintiffs were prohibited from making "unqualified,
misleading statements" to potential class members).
155. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.4 (a) (2007), which provides the
following:
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule, a lawyer shall not solicit
professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no
family or prior professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. A lawyer shall not
permit employees or agents of the lawyer to solicit in the lawyer's behalf. A lawyer
shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee for professional
employment obtained in violation of this rule. The term "solicit" includes contact in
person, by telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication directed to
a specific recipient and includes (i) any written form of communication directed to a
specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of subdivision (b) of this rule,
and (ii) any electronic mail communication directed to a specific recipient and not
meeting the requirements of subdivision (c) of rule 4-7.6.
Similarly, Rule 7.3(a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides,
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact
solicit professional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, unless the person
contacted:
(1) is a lawyer; or
(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the
lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2004).
156. See, e.g., GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 6 (2007) ("This Rule does not
prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action
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Nevertheless, even where the ethical rules of the jurisdiction in which
the action is pending do not restrict the ability of the plaintiffs attorney
to send notice to putative plaintiffs informing them of their right to opt
in to the action, plaintiffs' attorneys must be very careful regarding the

contents of any communication with putative plaintiffs in this context, as
much of the determination of what constitutes an ethical violation is left
to the discretion of the court.
Ultimately, placing a requirement on plaintiffs seeking to proceed
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, at least at the

"notice stage," to overcome a sort of "numerosity" requirement and

"successfully engage defendants' affidavits" is not only internally inconsistent, but is inconsistent with the purpose and procedure of the twotiered approach to collective-action certification. As the Fifth Circuit
stated in Mooney v. Aramco Services Co., in describing the "notice
stage" of the two-tiered approach, "Because the court has minimal evidence, this determination is made using a fairly lenient standard, and

typically results in 'conditional certification'

of a representative

class."' 57 The rationale underlying the more lenient standard identified
in Mooney, as well as Eleventh Circuit cases examined above, stems, at
least in part, from the two-tiered nature of the certification process and,
in turn, the limited information available at the notice stage."5 8 District
litigation"); Fla. Comm. on Prof I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 71-22 (1971) ("As pointed
out in the Disciplinary Rule, any contact with a member of a 'class' should not seek employment
in behalf of an attorney. Thus, at all events, whatever the direction of the court, any contact would
have to be dignified and to the end of advising of the pendency of a cause of action which may
affect the right of the person being contacted, but in no event should the contact seek to have such
person employ the original attorney in the litigation.").
It is particularly noteworthy in light of these ethical rules that even the mere sending of
notice to putative plaintiffs without leave of court may be interpreted as solicitation in violation of
ethical rules where putative plaintiffs are instructed to send consents to the plaintiff's attorney.
157. 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted). A sample of rulings on motions
for conditional certification available on LexisNexis reveals that, within the Eleventh Circuit, not
only is the "typical result" not a grant of conditional certification, but over twice as many motions
were denied as were granted. Running a LexisNexis terms and connectors search on six phrases
(motion for conditional certification of collective action or motion to certify collective action or
motion to facilitate nationwide class notice or motion to facilitate class notice or motion for
certification of collective action or motion for court ordered notification) for cases between 2004
and 2007 revealed that only three motions for conditional certification were granted, while ten
were denied. Of course, it is possible that a disproportionate number of those motions for
conditional certification that were denied are published on LexisNexis. However, there is no
alternative means available by which to obtain comparative data on these rulings.
158. As Judge Steam eloquently described the rationale underlying the relatively minimal
standard at the conditional certification stage during the hearing on class certification which lead
to conditional certification in Lusardi v. Xerox Corp.,

[D]own the road there will come a time when [the plaintiffs are] going to have to
show that for this case to go forward, that from all these notifications, and all this
investigation, and all this discovery, they have got an honest to goodness case. But I
have a pretty good idea where a cart is and where a horse is. I think the best way to
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courts outside of the Eleventh Circuit have readily accepted this notion.
For example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York, in Schwed v. General Electric Co., noted that "even where
later discovery proves the putative class members to be dissimilarly situated, notice to those preliminarily identified as potential plaintiffs prior
to full discovery is appropriate as it may further the remedial purpose of
the [FLSA]. 15 9
In sum, at the notice stage of certification of collective actions
under the two-tiered approach, a "numerosity" requirement for overcoming the first prong of Dybach, in conjunction with a requirement that
plaintiffs successfully engage defendant's affidavits in opposition,
places too stringent of a burden on plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively. While it is consistent with the competing goals of the FLSA that
plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively overcome some evidentiary
burden, these more stringent requirements, which are most often seen in
the context of nationwide and international collective actions, ultimately
undermine the goals of the collective-action provision as well as the
broader goals of the FLSA. Where plaintiffs are presented with the
"Catch-22" situation described above, the ability of plaintiffs to proceed
collectively effectively disappears, and this statutory provision of the
FLSA becomes meaningless. The inability to proceed collectively has
wider effects than merely to eliminate this procedural litigation strategy.
The ills of retaliation that underlie the existence of the collective-action
mechanism are greatly exacerbated where plaintiffs are set up to lose.
Defendant-employers may thus desire to retaliate by firing such an
employee not only for his personal involvement in litigation against the
employer, but for his attempts at subjecting the employer to the extensive costs and potential liability of a collective action.

find out if you have a cart from the horse is to let these people communicate in a
meaningful way with that group of people that they say they can prove were
wronged.
118 F.R.D. 351, 354 (D.N.J. 1987).
159. 159 F.R.D. 373, 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Downer v. Franklin Co., No. 7:02-CV0157, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16252, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2002) ("[T]he Court may authorize
notice to such potential plaintiffs at an early stage in the litigation, prior to completion of the
discovery period, in order to further the remedial goals of the FLSA and to promote efficient case
management."). On the remedial purpose of the FLSA, see Prickett v. DeKalb County, 349 F.3d
1294 (11th Cir. 2003). There, the court noted that "FLSA is a remedial statute that has been
construed liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction." Id. at
1286 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1466
(C.D. Cal. 1996) ("Because the FLSA is a remedial statute, it should be construed in order to
further Congress' goal of providing broad federal employment protection.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Employees Who Desire To Opt In Are "Similarly Situated"

Many district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have also denied
motions for conditional certification and court-authorized notice on the
ground that the plaintiff seeking conditional certification failed to satisfy
the second prong of Dybach: that other employees are "similarly situated."' 6 0 With respect to this second requirement, the Eleventh Circuit
in Dybach stated only that "the district court should satisfy itself that
there are other employees . . . who are 'similarly situated' with respect to
their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions."'' 6 The
requisite level of similarity between employees in order to satisfy this
second prong has differed greatly from case to case and court to court,
and district courts, left with little direction from the Eleventh Circuit,
have failed to state any uniform expression of factors relevant to the
"similarly situated" inquiry. Similar to the disconnect between the
stated requirement and application of that requirement regarding the first
Dybach prong discussed above, many of the district court decisions
denying conditional certification for failure to satisfy the second Dybach
prong have seemed to impose a more stringent burden than the language
expressed in Dybach and subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases would
require.
In some cases, denial of conditional certification appears rational
and in conformity with the requirements set forth in Dybach and subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases. For instance, in Brooks v. A Rainaldi
Plumbing Inc., the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida denied the plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification for failure to satisfy the second prong of Dybach.'6 2 The Brooks court noted
that, "[w]hile it is clear that, at this stage, Plaintiffs' burden is not heavy,
it is not invisible. Plaintiffs still must show that the class members are
similar for purposes of this FLSA action."' 6 3 Although the plaintiffs
filed affidavits, the court found that the evidence submitted did not support a finding that putative plaintiffs were similarly situated with respect
to the company they worked for, the positions they held, or their compensation structure. 164 These factors are entirely consistent with the
requirement set forth in Dybach and establish a readily ascertainable
standard to which plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively may look in
attempting to meet their burden.
160.
161.
162.
2006).
163.
164.

Dybach v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1567-68.
No. 6:06-cv-631-Orl-31DAB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89417, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8,
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6-7.
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Similarly, in Coots v. AFA Protective Systems, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the plaintiffs motion for conditional certification, discovery of names and
addresses of putative plaintiff class members, and permission to send
court-supervised notice on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to
show that the individuals to whom notice would be sent had similar job
requirements and were subject to similar pay provisions.1 65 Specifically,
the court found that "Plaintiff failed to make even a minimal showing
that the potential plaintiffs are similarly situated employees. In the complaint, Plaintiff never states his job title or duties or the potential plain' 66
tiffs' job titles or duties."'
In Smith v. Tradesman International,Inc., the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the plaintiff's motion
for court-supervised notice on the ground that "an insufficient amount of
discovery has taken place to enable [the court] to make an informed
decision on the issue of whether similarly situated employees exist." 167
The court, while denying the plaintiffs request for court-supervised
notice, granted the plaintiff's request for discovery of the names and
contact information of individuals falling within the proposed class so
that the plaintiff could obtain the evidence necessary to meet his burden.
The court stated, concerning the "similarly situated" inquiry at the notice
stage, that a number of relevant factors should be considered, including
the following:
1) whether the plaintiffs all held the same job title; 2) whether they
worked in the same geographic location; 3) whether the alleged violations occurred during the same time period; 4) whether the plaintiffs
were subjected to the same policies and practices and whether these
policies and practices were established in the same manner and by the
same decision maker; 5) the extent to which the actions which constitute the violations claimed by Plaintiffs are similar.' 6 8
The Smith court's grant of limited discovery in favor of the plaintiff
gives the plaintiff an opportunity to meet his evidentiary burden, if evidence sufficient to meet that burden indeed exists. Further, to some
extent, the factors laid out by the Smith court serve to define and interpret the requirement set forth in Dybach, that plaintiffs be similar with
"respect to job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions."
Nevertheless, these factors seem also to impose requirements beyond
165. No. 6:06-cv-129-Orl-28JGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71321, at *2, *10 (M.D. Fla. 2006

Oct. 2, 2006).
166. Id. at *7.
167. 289 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
168. Id.
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those anticipated by the Eleventh Circuit in Dybach, creating a higher
burden for plaintiffs to show they are "similarly situated."
Other rulings by district courts that rest on the second prong of
Dybach similarly appear to impose a more stringent requirement than
the language of Dybach and subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases would
seem to require. For instance, in Holt v. Rite Aid Corp., the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied the
plaintiffs' motion to facilitate notice for failure to satisfy the second
prong of Dybach. 6' 9 The court noted that "although the Eleventh Circuit
has made it clear that ... a plaintiff may establish that others are 'similarly situated' without pointing to a particular plan or policy, a plaintiff
must make some rudimentary showing of commonality ... beyond the
mere facts of job duties and pay provisions."17 Rather than looking to
the requirements set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Dybach, the Holt
court looked to the policy of judicial economy underlying the collectiveaction mechanism. The court reasoned that, "[w]ithout such a requirement, it is doubtful that § 216(b) would further the interests of judicial
economy, and it would undoubtedly present a ready opportunity for
abuse."' 1 While judicial economy is certainly one of the recognized
goals of the collective-action mechanism under the FLSA, it is not the
sole objective. Where numerous conflicting goals are present, it is disingenuous for the court to base its ultimate decision on only one of those
goals.
Similarly, in Wombles v. Title Max of Alabama, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied the
plaintiff's motion to facilitate class notice or, in the alternative, to issue
partial notice based on the plaintiff s failure to provide evidence that any
employees who desired to opt in were similarly situated.' 72 The court
noted that the plaintiff had the burden of making "some rudimentary
showing of commonality between the basis for his claims and that of the
potential claims of the proposed class, beyond the mere facts of job
duties and pay provisions." '7 3 Because the court found that the plaintiff
and the employees comprising the class sought to be certified were not
similarly situated, the court denied certification and authorization to
169. 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
170. Id. at 1270.
171. Id.
172. No. 3:03cvl 158-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34733, at *18 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2005).
173. Id. at *10 (quoting Holt, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1270). It is noteworthy that the two factors
identified by the Wombles court (i.e. job duties and pay provisions) were the same factors
identified by the Eleventh Circuit in Dybach v. Florida Department of Corrections, 942 F.2d

1562, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1991). Also see supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
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send notice.174
In imposing a requirement beyond that prescribed by the Eleventh
Circuit in Dybach, the Holt and Wombles courts relied specifically on
the policy of judicial economy said to underlie the collective-action provision. While the Wombles court recognized the broad remedial purposes intended to be served by the FLSA, it quickly dismissed any
concerns associated with undermining these remedial goals, stating,
"[C]ourts, as well as practicing attorneys, have a responsibility to avoid
the 'stirring up' of litigation through unwarranted solicitation."' 7 5 By
relying exclusively on the goal of judicial economy, however, these
courts create a danger of undermining the remedial goals intended to be
served by the FLSA as well as the ability of plaintiff-employees to proceed collectively, thereby pooling resources and deterring retaliation on
the part of employers. Further, dismissal of the requirements as stated
by the Eleventh Circuit in favor of more stringent requirements severely
undermines predictability in this area of the law. Plaintiffs looking to
the standards set forth by the Eleventh Circuit may find their motions for
conditional certification denied, in spite of meeting the apparent requirements set forth by the Eleventh Circuit. This has the potential to create a
situation whereby plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden because, as
soon as plaintiffs provide evidence sufficient to overcome the burden
expected to be imposed, the bar is raised.
Similar concerns for the promotion of predictability, the pursuit of
the goals of the collective-action provision, and the remedial goals of the
FLSA generally have arisen from cases such as Marsh v. Butler County
School System.' 7 6 In Marsh, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama denied the plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification and permission to send court-supervised notice to all others
similarly situated for failure to satisfy the second prong of Dybach.'7 7
The plaintiffs in Marsh "indicated an intention to proceed on a theory
that similarity is met without the presence of a policy or plan, based
simply on the fact that there are FLSA violations involving employees
174. Wombles, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34733, at *10-11.
175. Id. at *18 (quoting Brooks v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 561, 567 (N.D. Ala.
1995)); see also Home v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2003). The
Home court stated,
The competing considerations of the economy of scale envisioned by the FLSA
collective action procedure and the caution that courts as well as practicing
attorneys have a responsibility to avoid the stirring up of litigation through
unwarranted solicitation, require that this court determine that similarly situated
persons exist before certifying, even preliminarily, a case as a collective action.
279 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
176. 242 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
177. Id. at 1095.
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of the Defendant."' 178 The Marsh court first noted that, "while a unified
policy is not required in all cases [under Eleventh Circuit precedent], it
may be needed in a particular case to serve the policy of judicial economy."'

79

The court concluded that,

[w]here, as here, however, a plaintiff seeks certification of an FLSA
case ...on a theory that similarity is established by virtue of the

presence of other FLSA violations, rather than by job duties, there
must be at least some commonality among employment actions to
establish a pattern. The Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence to
support a finding that such a pattern exists in this case.
...Therefore,

the court is not satisfied that conditionally certify-

ing a collective action will achieve an economy of scale envisioned
by the FLSA collective action procedure.' 8 °
By imposing more stringent requirements than those set forth by
the Eleventh Circuit and relying solely on the objective of judicial economy, the Marsh court and courts establishing similarly high burdens
undermine predictability in the area of collective-action certification and
ultimately undermine the availability of the collective-action mechanism
as a means of FLSA enforcement. Similar problems to those discussed
in the preceding section on district courts' analysis of the first prong of
Dybach are also raised where a requirement of evidence showing a common scheme, plan, or policy is placed on plaintiffs. Specifically, where
plaintiffs are made to introduce evidence of a common scheme, plan, or
policy, without opportunity for extensive discovery, plaintiffs seeking to
proceed collectively are set up to lose.' 8 '
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's suggested approach to collective-action certification establishes, at least in theory, a seemingly low standard for
certification of collective actions at the notice stage. However, upon
examination of district court rulings on motions for certification of col178. Id. at 1092.

179. Id. The Marsh court further noted:
In addition to the policy of judicial economy noted by the Supreme Court [in
Hoffinann-La Roche], one court concluded that the remedy in § 216(b) is an attempt
by Congress to balance the competing policies of strict enforcement of the statutory
objective of insuring minimally acceptable pay levels and the avoidance of
economic disruption of unanticipated liabilities.
Id. at 1092 n.4 (citation omitted).
180. Id. at 1095-96 (citation omitted).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 130-46. The "Catch-22" described supra may also
exist in the context of the second prong of Dybach where courts impose a heightened requirement
upon plaintiffs to provide evidence of the existence of a common scheme, plan, or policy of FLSA
violations.
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lective actions, it becomes increasingly apparent that this approach is not
as easy to satisfy as its stated terms would purport. In fact, in the majority of cases, motions for conditional certification are denied.' 8 2 The
amalgamation of vague statutory language, competing policy goals, and
enormous grants of judicial discretion to trial courts has the potential to
severely undermine the goals of the collective-action mechanism, the
remedial goals of the FLSA, and the general goal of predictability.
Under the current state of law of collective-action certification within
the Eleventh Circuit, district courts appear entirely free to operate on the
basis of unbounded ad hoc determinations ("I know it when I see it"),
using empty language to provide some illusion that a determinate set of
standards exists. The fact that the "similarly situated" standard is
applied to both motions for certification of collective action and motions
for court-authorized notice to putative plaintiffs tends only to widen the
gap, not only between the theoretical framework and actual rulings but
between the broad remedial purposes intended to be served by that
framework and the outcomes actually reached.
To date, district courts have been given a great deal of discretion
and very limited direction both as to the standards and the procedures to
be applied in making collective-action certification decisions. While the
majority of district courts have uniformly adopted the two-tiered procedural approach suggested by the Eleventh Circuit, the standards used at
each stage have been far from uniform. Ambiguous language such as
"lenient," "less lenient," and "more stringent" has been used to define
the statutory requirements placed on plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively. More concerning, as described above, the standards that have
been applied by some district courts appear to leave plaintiffs set up to
lose. Although not all district courts have used standards effectively creating a "Catch-22," the few have the potential to swallow up the many as
the imposition of inconsistent standards reduces predictability and faith
in the judicial system. Where plaintiffs seeking to proceed collectively
are set up to lose (or, even where they merely believe they are set up to
lose), the statutory collective-action mechanism is effectively eviscerated, and plaintiffs may be unable to pool resources or effectively curb
retaliation by employers. The collective-action mechanism has played
an important role in FLSA enforcement, and any reduction in the availability of this mechanism serves to severely undermine the FLSA as a
remedial statute.

182. See supra note 157.

